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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
v

JEREMY D. PENICK,
Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo.20110495-CA

INTRODUCTION
Defendant responds to the State's arguments in its brief, and contends that the
police officer lacked probable cause to effectuate an arrest and that his counsel
ineffectively failed to move to suppress the evidence as required.

I. THE OFFICER LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE DEFENDANT
The State claims that the probable cause standard was met. However, the
officer's conduct did not fit within the law defining probable cause. Secondly, the
additional facts mentioned by the State still would not have provided the officer with
probable cause to arrest Mr. Penick. Consequently, defense counsel remained
ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence.
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a. The Standard for Probable Cause
The State claims, citing one authority, that the police officer had probable cause
to arrest Mr. Penick because a "fair probability" existed that Mr. Penick was the
suspect. Aple's Br. at 13,15-16, citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
The "fair probability" standard does not apply in situations in which probable
cause to arrest is needed. Gates involved an anonymous tip that a person was dealing
drugs. Id. at 213. The Supreme Court held that magistrates were not restricted to a
two-prong test for evaluating probable cause to search, but instead, they required
magistrates to apply a totality of the circumstances test to determine if "there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."
Id. at 238. The Court cautioned using mere statements in an affidavit as a basis to
support the issuance of a warrant, stating that a witness's or officer's sworn statement
"will not do." Id. at 239. Rather, according to the Court, the affidavit must give a
magistrate "a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause." Id. To
that end, the Court emphasized that it has "consistently recognized the value of
corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work" and that
"bare bones" affidavits did not rise to the level of probable cause. Id. at 239,241.
Gates does not create a "fair probability" test. Rather, it merely articulates that
in cases involving tips from an anonymous witness, magistrates must determine the
existence of probable cause based on the totality of circumstances. The Court took
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great care to emphasize that a magistrate must have a "substantial basis" to conclude
that probable cause exists and that officers must exercise great care to corroborate an
informant's tip. Id. at 239-41.
Probable cause, at detailed in Mr. Penick's opening brief, see Aplt's Br. at 19,
requires an objective basis to believe that a particular person has committed an
offense. The Supreme Court "repeatedly has explained that 'probable cause' to justify
an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in
the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about
to commit an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632, 61
L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979). In other words, the standard essentially requires the police to
have facts from which one could reasonably, and objectively, conclude that this
particular person committed the offense at hand. Thus, the standard is not one of "fair
probability," but of an objectively reasonable determination, using the totality of the
circumstances, that the suspect committed the offense.
b. The Defendant Presented an Adequate Record of the Lack of Probable
Cause in this Case
The State also contends that Mr. Penick failed to consider five specific facts
which it asserts strengthens its position. First, the defendant "locked eyes" with the
officer after averting his eyes. Aple's Br. at 16-17. Second, the detective stated that Mr.
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Penick was wearing the same pants as the black suspect from the video. Aple's Br. at
17. Third, Detective Coats used still shots from the surveillance video in making his
identification. Aple's Br. at 18. Fourth, the anonymous tipster provided "both a name
and an address" of the suspects. Aple's Br., at 18. Finally, the detective spoke with the
VOA director prior to arresting Mr. Penick. Aple's Br. at 18-19. Taken together, the
State contends, the Court may make several key assumptions from which it must
conclude that counsel's actions were the product of sound trial strategy. Aple's Br. at
19-20.
Mr. Penick will address each of these five facts in turn before examining the
cumulative effect of these facts on defense counsel's actions.
The defendant's "locked eyes" do nothing to establish the existence of probable
cause. The officer testified that Mr. Penick "then approached me, he came back,
locked eyes with me and walked up to me asking me why I was there, if I was going to
help with donations for the VOA and what was I investigating." R. 211:24. If someone
intends to talk with another person, the abnormal response would be to avoid eye
contact. The normal response would be to make eye contact. The State cites an
unpublished decision, which only references "unusual conduct" of a defendant as
indicative of a consciousness of guilt. Looking someone in the eyes when speaking to
him is not an unusual response, nor does it evince a consciousness of guilt. Defendant
has been unable to find a single reported case in which "locked eyes" were indicative
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of guilt. By extension, if the avoidance of eye contact does not support a determination
of probable cause, then the maintenance of eye contact would also not support that
determination since it, too, is "consistent with innocent" behavior. See State v.
Duhaime, 2011 UT App 209, f 18, 258 P.3d 649,657 (quoting State v. Robinson, 797
P.2d 431,436 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)).
The detective testified while reviewing the video tape that "the pants that
[Penick's] wearing are the pants that he had on the clay that I interviewed him." R.
211:74. There are several problems with this identification. First, the officer testified
that the colors were better on the computer. Id. In fact, he said that "[t]his video on
this screen right here is not a very good representation because in this video it looks
either a blue-grey or a blue." Id. The officer's only specific testimony about the pants
were that they were "grey pants." R. 211:18. He did not identify any distinguishing
characteristics that made them unique. Grey pants are a very common item and
nothing in the officer's testimony tends toward the conclusion that these pants had
any qualities that made them unique to the defendant. In fact, the officer did not see
Mr. Penick until two days after the crime. R. 211:77. Because the detective cannot
account for the passage of time between those two days, he cannot conclude that Mr.
Penick was the same person in the video based off of the pants alone. The pants worn
have little or nothing to do with a probable cause determination—no less an
identification—considering that multiple days passed between the viewing of the
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video and the defendant's arrest. Defendant could have received those pants from the
perpetrator or the shelter, for example.
The fact that the officer used video surveillance footage and circulated it to the
news media was referenced repeatedly in the defendant's brief. See Aplt's Br. at 20-21,
23. The fact that there were other still shots in the record of the same footage does not
change the analysis in any significant way since defendant already addressed the
impact of the surveillance footage. The officer still needed to confirm with the witness,
Mr. Magack, that the person in the surveillance footage and the person he was talking
to at the VOA, Jeremy Penick, were one and the same. This could have been done by a
simple lineup procedure.
The defendant acknowledged that the anonymous tipster gave the officer a
name and that the person was possibly staying at the VOA shelter. Aplt's Br. at 21. He
also acknowledged that the officer spoke with the director. Id. The State contends that
this Court can assume from these facts that: 1) the anonymous tipster gave the name
of Jeremy Penick, 2) that the officer identified the person he was speaking with as
Jeremy Penick in his conversation with the director, and 3) that defense counsel knew
all of these facts. Aple's Br. at 18-19. In fact, the State acknowledges that "the record
presented does not include any evidence on these matters" but that because defendant
failed to present evidence of these conclusions, this Court must assume that counsel
performed effectively. Aple's Br. at 19.
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The State claims that "[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court must
assume that trial counsel 'knew of materials outside the record'..." Aple's Br. at 19,
quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788,178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011) (emphasis
added). However, the full quotation from Richter does not support the State's
interpretation of that language.
Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel's representation is
a most deferential one. Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with
the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge. It is "all too tempting" to
"second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence."
Id. The Court does not say that courts are to presume defense counsel knew of facts
beyond the record—it only says that courts should defer to counsel's representation.
Richter does not mandate the imputation of knowledge; it only addresses the standard
of deference.
While the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating an adequate record, see
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92, the key issue is whether trial counsel
should have moved to suppress evidence. None of these pieces of evidence, even
assuming their truth, affects this decision. Assuming the officer was given the name of
Jeremy Penick by the anonymous tipster and that he spoke with the director of the
VOA, who told him that Jeremy Penick was a resident there, the officer still could not
connect Mr. Penick to the crime for purposes of probable cause.
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Jeremy Penick was clearly a resident of the VOA and the director could have
confirmed that fact. The detective needed only to corroborate the anonymous tipster's
information and verify that Mr. Magack believed this individual to be his assailant.
Nothing in the record demonstrates that the officer asked Mr. Penick his name prior
to arresting him. Nor did the officer ask Mr. Magack whether Mr. Penick and the
perpetrator were the same person. Nor did he ask the anonymous tipster how he or
she knew information about Mr. Penick.
The proper investigation would have been easy. The officer could ask Mr.
Penick his name. At that point, he would have corroborated the tip (that a person by
that name was at the VOA), but he still would not know whether Mr. Penick
committed the crime in question. To verify and corroborate that fact, he could have
asked Mr. Penick questions (instead of arresting him). He could have asked him to
voluntarily come in for questioning or for a lineup. The detective could have obtained
a photograph of Mr. Penick and conducted a lineup with Mr. Magack to ensure that
Mr. Penick and the suspect were one in the same.
Under the State's line of reasoning, this Court is to make several key logical
leaps. First, it must assume that the anonymous tipster gave the name of Jeremy
Penick. It must also assume that the tipster saw the picture of Jeremy Penick (which
does not appear to be the case, since the tipster mentioned that two males were talking
about attacking a taxi driver). R. 211:21. Then the Court must assume that when the
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detective spoke with the director, she confirmed that the person downstairs was, in
fact, Jeremy Penick. But, even assuming all of these facts are true, one cannot get over
the final, critical assumption: this Court must still assume that Jeremy Penick was the
one who assaulted Mr. Magack. At the stage of arrest, the detective lacked probable
cause of that fact.
Mr. Magack had identified the person in the photo as his attacker. The tipster
potentially said that Jeremy Penick talked about being the attacker. The officer
potentially discovered that the individual who spoke with him was Jeremy Penick.
Thus, the officer needed only confirm that Jeremy Penick was the person who
attacked Mr. Magack and he would have had probable cause to effectuate an arrest.
Yet, he failed to take further steps to confirm that fact and he arrested Mr. Penick
without probable cause.
This failure was critical because defense counsel would have no objective basis
upon which to fail to move to suppress the evidence. As demonstrated in Mr. Penick's
opening brief, the motion would have been granted and the result would have been
different. See Aplt's Br. at 18-30.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Penick asks this Court to find that the officer
lacked probable cause to arrest him and that his counsel ineffectively failed to move to
suppress evidence found as a result of that arrest.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22-

day of May, 2012.

P

t±e

SAMUEL P. NEWTON
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant

RULE 24 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to rule 24(f)(1)(C), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I certify that this
brief has been prepared in a proportionally-spaced font using Microsoft Word for
Mac 2011 in Minion Pro 13.5 point, and contains 2202 words, excluding the table of
contents, table of authorities, and addenda.

SAMUEL P. NEWTON
Atrorney for the Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(ll) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, no
addendum is necessary given the arguments made in this brief.
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